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Abstract
Both in theory and practice, capital controls and dual exchange rate
systems can be part of a country￿ s optimal tax policy. We ￿rst show how
a dual exchange rate system can be interpreted as a tax (or subsidy) on
international capital income. We show that a dual exchange rate system,
with separate commercial and ￿nancial exchange rates, drives a wedge
between the domestic and foreign returns on comparable assets. As a
borrower, the government itself is a direct bene￿ciary. Secondly, based
on data from South Africa, we present empirical evidence of this revenue
implicit in a dual exchange rate system; a revenue that amounted to as
much as 0.1 percent of GDP for the South African government. However,
this paper also shows that both the capital controls and the dual exchange
rate system in South Africa gave rise to many perverse unanticipated
e⁄ects. The latter may render capital controls and dual exchange rate
systems unattractive in the end and, thereby, provides a rationale for the
recent trend in exchange rate liberalization and uni￿cation. Keywords:
Dual exchange rate systems, capital controls, emerging markets, ￿nancial
repression, optimal tax policy JEL classi￿cation: H21.
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11 Introduction
Many countries today maintain capital controls. As of 2005, only ten out the
IMF￿ s 185 members are fully free of controls on capital account transactions.1 It
should be emphasized, though, that the most restrictive ones are to be found in
developing countries. On the other hand, as of 2005, only eleven countries out
of the IMF￿ s 185 members are reported to have more than one exchange rate.
Each of them is, again, a developing country.2 Although this number seems
small, it has only been so since a few years. At the end of 1993, as Kiguel, et
al. (1997) point out, over 25% of the then 158 developing country members of
the IMF had more than one exchange rate. South Africa (hereafter also SA),
the subject of this paper, was one of them.
As, among others, Aizenman and Guidotti (1990), Giovannini and De Melo
(1991) and Greenwood and Kimbrough (1985) argue, capital controls, often ac-
companied by various types of ￿nancial market restrictions, can have substantial
￿scal implications. Moreover, as, among others, Bernstein (1950), Adams and
Greenwood (1985), Aizenman (1986), and Frenkel and Razin (1989) argue, dual
exchange rate regimes, as well, have long been recognized to be quasi-￿scal ac-
tivities. In this paper we de￿ne a typical (standard) dual exchange rate system
to be a system where one exchange rate is applied to current account transac-
tions and another exchange rate is used for capital account transactions.3 The
former exchange rate is often ￿xed and labelled the commercial exchange rate,
whereas the latter is often allowed to ￿ oat and termed the ￿nancial exchange
rate. A dual exchange rate system with, for example, a commercial exchange
rate (for current account transactions) and a ￿nancial exchange rate (for capital
account transactions), is, as we will show below, equivalent to a tax on foreign
source income accruing to domestic residents if the commercial exchange rate is
more appreciated than the ￿nancial exchange rate.
As a result of their ￿scal implications, capital controls and dual exchange
rate systems can especially be found in developing countries. That is, they both
can have a useful role as part of a developing country￿ s optimal tax scheme (see,
for example, Aizenman (1986)). As a result of, for example, a taxation implicit
in the dual exchange rate system on foreign source income accruing to domestic
residents, the domestic interest rate could be set lower than the international
interest rate. As a borrower, the government itself will be a direct bene￿ciary.
In this paper our focus is ￿rmly on South Africa, a country we choose delib-
erately. First, South Africa is a key developing country. Second, despite the fact
1International Monetary Fund (2005 issue). These countries are: Guatemala, Israel,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Spain, Zambia and Hong Kong SAR
(ibid., pp. 18-24)).
2These countries are: the Bahamas, Botswana, Cambodia, Guinea, Myanmar, Sierra Leone,
Somalia, Nigeria, Suriname, the Syrian Arab Republic and Zimbabwe. The ￿rst seven have
dual exchange rate systems and the last four have multiple exchange rates. (ibid., pp. 18-24)
3Take note that there are also other types of dual exchange rate systems. See, for example,
Kiguel, et al. (1997) for an excellent discussion on dual exchange rates.
2that South Africa is a developing country, historically (and presently) it has a
quite sophisticated and well-developed ￿nancial system. This makes it possible
to obtain (reliable) data. Third, ever since the Sharpeville massacre in 1960 and
the subsequent capital out￿ ow, South Africa has been characterized by (some
or other form of) capital controls. Fourth, over the period from 1960 until 1995
South Africa experienced ￿ve di⁄erent exchange rate systems of which four were
dual exchange rate systems. Only two of these periods, however, were character-
ized by a dual exchange rate system as de￿ned above, making it possible for us
to compare it with the other three. Finally, over the period under discussion the
South African government almost exclusively borrowed from its own residents.
This can be seen from ￿gure 1 below.4 In addition, from 1985 onwards (until
1994), South Africa was subject to international sanctions and was not allowed
to borrow from the IMF or any other o¢ cial agency. As a result, the above
discussed issue of using capital controls and/ or a dual exchange rate system













Figure 1. South African government debt (rand billion).
For a country that has a "normal", single exchange rate system without
restrictions on capital ￿ ows, the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) condition
should, at least in theory, hold for comparable assets.5 Below, in ￿gure 2,
the deviation from uncovered interest rate parity (for SA and the US) is given.6
4The data has been obtained from Thomson Datastream, where we used SADBTDLNA
and SADBTFLNA for the domestic and foreign South African government debt, respectively.
The total government debt was computed by adding these two.
5For a recent discussion of UIP see Lambelet and Mihailov (2006). Using a cross-section of
trend growth rates of relevant variables for 18 OECD countries in the post-Bretton Woods/
pre-EMU ￿oating rate period (1976-1988) and employing a variety of single-equation and
system estimation methods, they present robust evidence that (what they label) the ￿ triple-
parity law￿(which combines UIP, PPP and real interest parity (RIP)) ultimately holds for
large and diversi￿ed economies.
6For this make use of equation (2), which is given in the main text. Straightforwardly, we
3Interestingly, in the 1970s there was an extended period (which we highlighted in
the ￿gure) in which UIP did fundamentally not hold. More speci￿cally, although
most of SA debt was held by SA residents (as indicated by ￿gure 1), during the
highlighted period the return for a non-resident (US) holder of South African
debt was structurally in excess of the return on comparable assets in the United
States (as indicated by the return di⁄erential over UIP). In what follows we will
explain that this excess return was in fact equivalent to an investment subsidy,
which in turn came about as a by-product of South Africa￿ s dual exchange rate
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Figure 2. Excess return in South Africa (in perunages).
First, we show how a dual exchange rate system can be interpreted as a tax
(or subsidy) on international capital income. We make use of previous work
by Huizinga (1996). We will show that a dual exchange rate system gives a
theoretical reason for a deviation from uncovered interest rate parity.
Second, we will discuss South Africa from 1973:01 until 1995:02. That is,
we will give a detailed assessment of the historic development of South Africa￿ s
dual exchange rate system. For this we make use of previous work by Schaling
(2005).7 Interestingly, we show that exactly, and only, during that particular
period in the 1970s (highlighted in ￿gure 2), the South African government was
able to in￿ uence the implicit subsidy.
Finally, we bring the issues to the data and do some empirical estimations
for South Africa. By making use of a few straightforward estimating equations
calculated: [(e1=e2)(1 + i)]￿(1 + i￿). That is, for a non-resident (US) investor the deviation
from UIP is equal to the return he would obtain in South Africa minus the return he would
obtain on comparable, domestic (US) assets. Following UIP this return di⁄erential should be
equal to zero. See the main text for a more elaborate discussion and, in particular, subsection
4.1 for a more elaborate discussion of the variables and its sources.
7Schaling (2005), on his turn, built further on Farrell and Todani (2004) and Gidlow (1979).
4we ￿nd that the consequences of the implicit taxation and subsidy in a dual
exchange rate are sizable and signi￿cant, and indeed only in that (highlighted)
period. In addition, we calculate the ￿scal implications of a dual exchange rate
system for South Africa.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The equivalence between
￿nancial taxation by way of taxes on cross-border capital ￿ ows and a dual
exchange rate system is shown in section 2. Section 3, analyses each of the ￿ve
(dual) exchange rate regimes in place in South Africa for the period 1973-1995
in more detail. Section 4 and 5 discuss the data and the econometric approach,
respectively. In section 6 our empirical results are given, and we conclude in
section 7.
2 The model
By making use of some straightforward arbitrage relationships, this section will
discuss the characteristics of a standard dual exchange rate system. This section
builds on the model and intuition in Huizinga (1996).
2.1 Arbitrage relationships
For comparison, let us ￿rst assume that the home country (South Africa) has
a single uni￿ed exchange rate. Consider a two-period model, where in the ￿rst
period one unit of currency is invested from the home country into the foreign
country (the US). In the second period, both the interest and the principal are
repatriated. More speci￿cally, let i and i* be the domestic and foreign interest
rate in perunages. Let ej be the exchange rate in period j, where subscript j
= 1, 2. The exchange rate is fully convertible and de￿ned as unit of domestic
currency per unit of foreign currency (rand per dollar). A resident (SA) investor
is indi⁄erent between owning domestic (SA) and foreign (US) assets when the
following arbitrage relationship holds
1 + i =
e2
e1
(1 + i￿) (1)
In period 1, the resident (SA) investor can convert one unit of his domestic cur-
rency into 1/e1units of foreign currency. In period 2, the interest and principal
are repatriated at e2. Analogously, a non-resident (US) investor is indi⁄erent
between owning domestic (US) and foreign (SA) assets when the following ar-
bitrage relationship holds
1 + i￿ =
e1
e2
(1 + i) (2)
In period 1, the non-resident (US) investor can convert one unit of foreign cur-
rency into e1 units of domestic currency. In period 2, the interest and principal
5are repatriated at 1/e2. Note that equation (1) and (2) are the same8 and use
the well-known concept of uncovered interest parity (UIP); a classical topic in
international ￿nance and a building block of most of its theoretical models.9
Now let us discuss the more interesting case of a standard dual exchange
rate system (hereafter DRS as opposed to a uni￿ed exchange rate system or
URS). That is, we assume that there are separate exchange rates for current
and capital account transactions in place (as we de￿ned earlier). Consider again
a two-period model, where in the ￿rst period one unit of currency is invested
from the home country into the foreign country. In the second period, both the
interest and the principal are repatriated. Let i and i*, again, be the domestic
and foreign interest rate. In addition, let ej and fj be respectively the commercial
(o¢ cial) and ￿nancial exchange rate in period j, j = 1, 2. As discussed above, ej
is then related to current and fj to capital account transactions. The exchange
rates are fully convertible. A resident (SA) investor is indi⁄erent between owning
domestic and foreign assets when the following arbitrage relationship holds







In period 1, the resident (SA) investor can convert one unit of his domestic
currency into 1/f1units of foreign currency. In period 2, the principal and the
interest are repatriated at the ￿nancial and commercial exchange rates, f2 and e2,
respectively.10 Analogously, a non-resident (US) investor is indi⁄erent between
owning domestic and foreign assets when the following arbitrage relationship
holds







In period 1, the non-resident (US) investor can convert one unit of foreign
currency into f1 units of domestic currency. In period 2, the principal and
interest are again repatriated at the ￿nancial and commercial exchange rates,
1/f2 and 1/e2, respectively. Contrary to equations (1) and (2), equations (3) and
(4) are not the same and do not equal UIP.11 This is of utmost importance to
this paper and its consequences will be discussed in more detail in the following
two subsections.
8That is, equation (2) follows from rewriting equation (1) from the perspective of a non-
resident (foreign) investor. In natural logs, for example, both equations can be written as
follows
^ {0 = ^ {0￿ + ^ e2 ￿ ^ e1 (1￿= 2￿ )
where ^ {0 = ln(1 + it), ^ {0￿ = ln(1 + i￿
t) and ^ ej = ln(ej).
9As in the literature, also this paper assumes rational expectations. That is, we will assume
that et+1 = Et [et+1] + "t+1, where Et ["t+1] = 0.
10Interest, as other income from foreign investments, is documented in the current account.
Conversely, the principal is documented in the capital account.
11In natural logs equation (4) becomes
^ {0￿ = ^ {00 ￿
￿
^ f2 ￿ ^ f1
￿
(4￿ )
where ^ {0￿ = ln(1 + i￿), ^ {00 ￿ ln(1 + i + si) and ^ fj = ln(fj), where s ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 and ￿ ￿ f2=e2.
62.2 The need for capital controls
Generally, equations (1) and (2) are consistent. That is, under a "normal", single
exchange rate system (URS) there is no need for capital controls. To check this
one could substitute either one of the two formulas into the other. The result
will be an expression stating that the returns abroad equal the returns at home,
or vice versa. The di⁄erence between the two returns is zero. The arbitrage
equations for a resident (SA) and a non-resident (US) investor are therefore
consistent and will hold simultaneously. Consequently, it is not possible for an
investor to reap excess returns12 and there will be no need for capital controls.13
On the other hand, equation (3) and (4) are generally not consistent. In
other words, when a standard dual exchange rate system is in place there is a
need for capital controls. To check this, let us assume that equation (4) in fact
holds so that non-resident investors are indi⁄erent between holding domestic
and foreign assets (as we will see below this was the case for South Africa).
Contrary to the result we obtained under a "normal" exchange rate system,
when we now substitute any of the two equations into the other we obtain an
expression that states that the di⁄erence between the return at home and abroad
could be di⁄erent from zero
v = (f2 ￿ e2)(1=f1 ￿ 1=f2) (5)
where v is the di⁄erence between the return at home and abroad. So, theoret-
ically under a DRS there could be a deviation from UIP. As Huizinga (1996)
points out, when equation (4) holds a non-resident (US) investor, for example,
can achieve a higher return on foreign assets, i.e. 1+i < (f2=f1)+(e2=f1)i*, if
equation (5) is positive. This holds if the ￿nancial exchange rate (fj) depre-
ciates, i.e., 1/f1 > 1/f2, and the commercial exchange rate (ej) commands a
premium over the ￿nancial exchange rate (fj), i.e. f2 > e2, or if both conditions
are reversed. Any inconsistency of the arbitrage relationships (3) and (4) is a re-
￿ ection of the fact that each of the two a⁄ects a resident (SA) or a non-resident
(US) investor disparately. With (3) and (4) not holding simultaneously, capital
controls need to be introduced to prevent some investors from reaping in￿nite
gains.
Interestingly, equation (5) was indeed positive for South Africa over the 1973-
1995 period; the period under discussion in our paper. Throughout this period,
On the other hand, in natural logs equation (3) boils down to
^ {0 = ^ {00￿ +
￿
^ f2 ￿ ^ f1
￿
(3￿ )
where ^ {0 = ln(1 + i) and ^ {00￿ ￿ ln(1 + i￿ ￿ ￿i￿), where ￿ ￿ ￿￿1=￿ and ￿ ￿ f2=e2. Take note
that indeed, in contrast to 1￿= 2￿ , equation (3￿ ) 6= (4￿ ). We will discuss this in more detail
below.
12Which here - in the absence of capital controls - would allow investors to reap in￿nite
gains. This is shown below.
13It should be noted that this is an obvious result because we already concluded in the
previous subsection that equation (1) and (2) are the same.
7as ￿gure 3 below shows,14 the ￿nancial exchange rate depreciated and the com-
mercial exchange rate commanded a premium over the ￿nancial exchange rate.
As we discussed, in this case capital controls will have to be introduced on
resident (SA) investors. Consequently, arbitrage relationship (3) becomes irrel-
evant. This indeed happened in South Africa. As a result, the authorities are
then free to choose an exchange rate policy consistent with the desired domes-
tic interest rate, i, according to arbitrage relationship (4). As Schaling (2005)
notes, the South African capital controls enabled the South African Reserve
Bank to target domestic interest rates (and/ or the commercial exchange rate)
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Figure 3. Commercial and ￿nancial rand exchange rates (R/$).
2.3 The exchange rate as taxation
Finally, this subsection will consider the tax treatment of interest (or other in-
come from foreign investment) implicit in a standard dual exchange rate system.
Before we continue, it is important to note that South Africa had ￿ve di⁄erent
(dual) exchange rate regimes over the 1960s-1995 period. Only two of them
equaled the standard dual exchange rate system as de￿ned above.15
First, let us obtain the subsidy and taxation implicit in a standard dual
exchange rate system intuitively. Under such a system, a non-resident (say, US)
investor holding domestic (SA) assets will receive 1/e2 rather than 1/f2 units of
foreign currency for each unit of interest repatriated abroad. This implies that
14BR, SR, FR(I), UR and FR(II) are respectively the blocked rand- (1973:01 - 1976:02), the
securities rand- (1976:02 - 1979:01), the ￿rst ￿nancial rand- (1979:01 - 1983:02), the uni￿ed
rand- (1983:02 - 1985:08) and the second ￿nancial rand period (1985:08 - 1995:02). We will
discuss this in more detail below.
15This will be discussed in more detail in the next section.
8non-resident investors receive an additive subsidy s for each unit of interest
equal to ￿ ￿ 1, where ￿ = f2/e2 is the gross ￿nancial rate premium over the
commercial rate. We have that
s = (f2 ￿ e2)=e2 (6)
or, for completeness, s = ￿=(1 ￿ ￿),16 where ￿ is the tax rate on repatriated
interest earned by (SA) residents abroad.17
In addition, we can obtain the subsidy and taxation implicit in a standard
dual exchange rate system in a more formal way. For this, let us rewrite equation
(4), the arbitrage relationship under a standard dual exchange rate system for
a non-resident (US) investor, to obtain18
1 + i￿ =
f1
f2
(1 + i + si) (4￿ )
where s is given by equation (6). The left-hand side, together with the ￿rst
term on the right-hand side and the ￿rst two terms in the brackets on the
right-hand side constitute the uncovered interest-rate parity condition (where
we have substituted f for e) as obtained in subsection 2.1 (equation (4)). This
is of importance and to see this we have to link the URS and DRS.
Let us make a general formula by rewriting equation (4) one more time to
obtain









where we have decomposed the second term on the right-hand side of equation
(4) as the product of the (future or ￿ expected￿ ) ￿nancial rand discount f2/e2
and the ￿ expected￿rate of nominal ￿nancial rand appreciation f1/f2. Under
a standard URS, fj = ej and consequently equation (8) equals the standard
URS for a non-resident (US) investor (equation (2)). We then have that UIP
holds. However, things are di⁄erent under a DRS. If we assume (as was the
case for South Africa) that the ￿nancial rand trades at a discount vis-￿-vis the
commercial rand exchange rate, or f2/e2 > 1, then equation (8) does no longer
equal equation (2). That is, under a DRS, the relevant arbitrage equation for a
non-resident (US) investor does not equal UIP.
16We know from equation (7), which is given below, that ￿ = [(￿ ￿ 1)=￿]. This can be
rewritten as follows: ￿ = 1 ￿ (1=￿), (1=￿) = 1 ￿ ￿, ￿ = 1=(1 ￿ ￿), ￿ ￿ 1 = 1=(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 1,
equalling ￿ ￿ 1 = ￿=(1 ￿ ￿). Knowing that ￿ ￿ 1 is equal to s we obtain that s = ￿=(1 ￿ ￿).
17The argument from the perspective of a resident investor is as follows. Under a standard
DRS, resident (SA) investors holding foreign assets receive e2 rather than f2 units of domestic
currency for each unit of repatriated interest. This implies that repatriated interest is taxed
at the following rate
￿ = (f2 ￿ e2)=f2 (7)
or, for completeness, ￿ = (￿ ￿ 1)=￿, where ￿ = f2/e2 is again the gross ￿nancial rate pre-
mium over the commercial rate. Since, SA residents were e⁄ectively prohibited from investing
o⁄shore we will focus on equation (6) and not on equation (7).
18See appendix (8.1) for the full derivation.
9Now let us go back to equation (4￿ ). We now know that the left-hand side
together with the ￿rst term and the ￿rst two terms in the brackets on the
right-hand side (where we have substituted fj for ej) constitute the uncovered
interest-rate parity condition. However, contrary to a URS, under a DRS there
is an additional term added to UIP. The third term in the brackets on the right-
hand side of equation (4￿ ) is the subsidy for a non-resident investor that is
implicit in the standard dual exchange rate system times the domestic interest
rate (si), where s is given by (6). As expected the subsidy implicit in a standard
dual exchange rate system has, for a non-resident (US) investor, a positive sign
in equation (4￿ ). As a result, we can conclude that for a non-resident (US)
investor a dual exchange rate system gives a reason for a theoretical deviation
from UIP. Secondly, we can conclude that, knowing that non-residents holding
SA assets receive 1/e2 rather than 1/f2 units of foreign currency for each unit
of interest repatriated abroad, a standard dual exchange rate system subsidizes
capital in￿ ows, i.e. it subsidized international lending to SA.19
3 South Africa
From June 1961 until March 1995, South Africa experienced a variety of di⁄erent
(dual) exchange rate systems. Below we will discuss each of them in more detail,
where we take South Africa to be the home country.20
3.1 The blocked rand system (1961-1976)
As pointed out by Gidlow (1976), the blocked rand system was largely based
on the measures taken after the Sharpeville massacre in March 1961 and the
subsequent capital out￿ ow and decline in the gold and foreign exchange reserves.
19Analogously, equation (3), the arbitrage relationship under a standard dual exchange rate
system for a resident investor, can be rewritten (following similar steps as in appendix 8.1 but
then using ￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)=￿ instead of s ￿ ￿ ￿ 1) to obtain
1 + i =
f2
f1
(1 + i￿ ￿ ￿i￿) (3￿)
where ￿ is given by equation (7). The left-hand side together with the ￿rst term and the ￿rst
two terms in the brackets on the right-hand side constitute the uncovered interest-rate parity
condition for a resident investor as we discussed in subsection 2.1 (where we have substituted
fj for ej). Again, contrary to the uncovered interest parity condition, there is an additional
term. The third term in the brackets on the right-hand side is the taxation for a resident
investor that is implicit in the dual exchange rate system times the foreign interest rate (￿i￿).
As a result, we again obtain the result that a dual exchange rate system gives a reason for a
theoretical deviation from UIP. As expected the taxation implicit in a standard dual exchange
rate system has, for a resident investor, a negative sign in equation (3￿). Since SA residents
were e⁄ectively prohibited from investing o⁄shore, in the main text we will focus on equation
(4￿) instead.
20This section is largely based on Schaling (2005) and various issues of the World Currency
Yearbook.
10Stricter controls on capital out￿ ows from South Africa were introduced in order
to prevent the depletion of foreign reserves.
The most important measure taken at that time was the introduction of
restrictions on the repatriation of funds earlier invested in South Africa by non-
residents. Residents were already prohibited to transfer funds abroad. Farrell
and Todani (2004) point out that, although non-residents could still sell do-
mestic securities on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) and interest and
dividends could still be freely transferred to the country of origin of the investor,
the proceeds of sales of South African assets were blocked within South Africa.
These ￿ blocked rands￿were deposited in blocked rand accounts in the name
of the non-resident at a commercial bank.21 Schaling (2005), in turn, points
out that as a consequence the notional demand for foreign currency (supply of
rand) did not materialize on the commercial market for rands. More speci￿cally,
only that demand induced by imminent liquidation of South African assets by
non-residents materialized on the commercial rand market. As Schaling (2005)
explains, the commercial exchange rate was therefore insulated from the selling
pressures of South African securities by non-residents. As a result, the com-
mercial exchange rate was likely to be substantially overvalued with respect to
the hypothetical level of the exchange rate in the absence of the aforementioned
controls.
The blocked rand balances could only be repatriated under certain condi-
tions. Farrell and Todani (2004) summarize as follows:22
(i) Non-residents could use blocked rands to purchase shares quoted on the
JSE. These shares could be endorsed, exported and sold outside South
Africa, for example in London. If the new non-resident owner of the
shares sold them in South Africa, blocked rands were again created;
(ii) The non-resident could use blocked rands to purchase government, munic-
ipal and public utility stocks with a maturity of ￿ve years or more. Once
these had been held for at least ￿ve years, they could be repatriated at
the commercial exchange rate;
(iii) The non-resident could use the blocked rands to take up special non-
resident bonds with ￿ve year maturities issued by the government. These
could again be repatriated at the commercial exchange rate on maturity.
As pointed out by Schaling (2005), and in line with (i), there was no re-
striction on a non-resident investor using his blocked rands to purchase local
21See Farrell and Todani (2004) and Gidlow (1976).
22Under a standard DRS the capital (principal) would enter (and leave) via the ￿nancial
market, and the interest would leave via the commercial market in line with arbitrage equation
(4) (applicable to non-residents). For more details on the blocked rand mechanism see Schaling
(2005).
11securities, then selling those securities to another non-resident for foreign cur-
rency and, subsequently, the sale of these local securities by the new non-resident
owner in South Africa for blocked rands. As Schaling (2005) discusses, while
individual non-residents could therefore disinvest from South Africa (if they
found another non-resident willing to buy their South African ￿nancial assets),
non-residents as a group could not.
As pointed out by Gidlow (1976), the fact that non-residents could use their
blocked rands to purchase shares quoted on the JSE, which then could be en-
dorsed, exported and sold outside South Africa again, enabled London stock bro-
kers to make a market for blocked rands. In this market the relevant monies were
freely transferred between non-residents using a method known as ￿ gilt-wash￿ .23
Via this ￿ gilt-wash￿method, a de facto second currency emerged. Farrell and
Todani (2004) point out that, although this parallel blocked rand market could
be characterized as legal, it was not o¢ cially recognized. As Schaling (2005)
notes, this was because South Africa operated under the aegis of Bretton Woods,
i.e. under a system of ￿xed exchange rates. A ￿ oating parallel exchange rate
was an alien and probably unwelcome species at the time.
Under the blocked rand system a non-resident investor could invest in South
African securities in two di⁄erent ways,
(a) He or she could use the direct channel via the o¢ cial foreign exchange
market, that is to buy foreign currency on the o¢ cial (commercial) foreign
exchange market and exchange the latter for South African securities.
Note that this route of investment is di⁄erent from the route under a
standard dual exchange rate system;
(b) Alternatively, he or she could use the indirect channel via the stock ex-
changes. That is, the non-resident could ￿rst buy South African securities
listed in London with foreign currency, sell the securities in Johannesburg
and get blocked rand in return in order to buy South African securities.
Note that this route of investment is equal to the one under a standard
dual exchange rate system.
It is important to note that the investor will end up with the same securities,
i.e. South African securities. The only di⁄erence is the way they are obtained
(either via route (a) or via route (b)). Of course, the non-resident investor
would have made use of the direct (indirect) channel when the commercial
rand exchange rate traded at a discount (premium) vis-￿-vis the blocked rand
exchange rate.
Owing to the fact that the blocked rand exchange rate traded at a discount
vis-￿-vis the commercial rand exchange rate, it was cheaper for non-residents
23An example can be found in Schaling (2005).
12to invest in South Africa via the indirect channel. However, a non-resident in-
vestor could only invest into South Africa via the indirect channel (route b) if
another non-resident, holding South African assets, was willing to disinvest from
South Africa. Thus there could be no net investment into South Africa via the
blocked rand market (the "closed pool" argument). As Schaling (2005) notes,
this would be the case up to 1995 when the dual exchange rate system was abol-
ished. Net investments, as a result, could only come into South Africa through
the commercial market (route a). However that would only be attractive for
non-resident investors in the counterfactual case of the blocked rate trading at
a premium vis-￿-vis the commercial rand exchange rate.
Let us combine the above information and summarize the blocked rand ex-
change rate system in a table. During the blocked rand exchange rate system,
as during the other four exchange rate periods, resident investors were not al-
lowed to invest abroad. Consequently, we left the case for a resident investor
out of table 1 and all of the subsequent related tables (this is in line with the
main text focusing on the arbitrage equations for non-residents only). Now, let
us take ej and bj to be respectively the commercial and blocked rand exchange
rate in period j, j = 1, 2. In addition, let (i), (ii), (iii) and (a) and (b) be the
di⁄erent routes of respectively repatriation and investment as discussed above.
We obtain
Table 1.
Invest principal: Repatriate principal: Repatriate interest:
Non-resident: Via (a): e1, or Via (i): b2, or e2
via (b): b1 via (ii): e2, or
via (iii): e2
3.2 The securities rand system (1976-1979)
As pointed out by Farrell and Todani (2004), although the possibility of abol-
ishing the blocked rand exchange rate system was raised various times, changes
were only announced in 1975. More speci￿cally, changes in the exchange control
regulations were made in order to boost non-resident investors￿interest in South
Africa. However, controls on capital out￿ ows by non-residents as a pool re-
mained very much the same. But, some details of the mechanism were changed,
resulting in the introduction of the securities rand exchange rate mechanism in
February 1976.
From February 1976 onwards, the term ￿ securities rand￿(instead of blocked
rand) had to be used to denote the domestic sale and redemption of South
African securities, and other investments in South Africa, owned by non-residents.
All non-resident accounts falling under this category had to be designated se-
curities rand accounts.24 In addition, as Schaling (2005) notes, the blocked
24Schaling (2005)
13accounts of immigrants to South Africa who had not completed three years of
residence also had to be designated securities rand accounts. However, emi-
grant￿ s funds that were blocked in South Africa, as other accounts of emigrants
designated as blocked rand accounts, continued to be referred to as blocked
rands. Consequently, from February 1976 onwards the term ￿ blocked rand￿had
a more restricted meaning.
As pointed out by Schaling (2005), under the new regulations securities
rand were bought and sold through brokers on the JSE. The idea was that
by removing the necessity of dealing through the indirect (London) channel,
blocked rands could be transferred more easily and more cheaply, and become
more accessible to non-resident investors. In addition, under the new regula-
tions, only those branches of authorized foreign exchange dealers who have been
appointed as authorized banks may maintain securities rand balances. Conse-
quently, the securities rand exchange rate system allowed for direct transfers
between non-residents and for the trading of the securities rand through bro-
kers on the JSE. Schaling (2005) explains that this was a major change with
respect to the blocked rand exchange rate system. Allowing the latter would
have granted o¢ cial recognition of the blocked rand exchange rate, an action
that the authorities deemed undesirable on an era of ￿xed exchange rates. How-
ever, as Schaling (2005) points out, in 1976 the era of irrevocable ￿xed exchange
rates was over. South Africa now had a variable rand-dollar peg (the commer-
cial rand) combined with the securities rand, that is combined with an extensive
menu of capital controls on residents and non-residents.
Another reason for changing to the securities rand system was that securities
rand would be bought and sold through brokers on the JSE, thereby relocating
trade from London to Johannesburg.25 Farrell and Todani (2004), though,
point out that this did not materialize, primarily because of the dominance of
London as the ￿nancial centre. The familiarity of non-resident investors with
London, the technical superiority of the market and the operations of London
dealers as principals in the blocked (and now the securities) rand market were
all contributory factors.
Finally, Gidlow (1976) points out that, by allowing non-resident balances to
be transferred freely and to o¢ cially recognize the blocked (now the securities)
rand discount, the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) had now the ability to
enter the market for securities rand as well. Hence, the South African Reserve
Bank could now intervene in the securities rand market. This paper will show
that this move by the South African government was of utmost importance for
the ￿nancial implications of the dual exchange rate system. We will get back
to this in section 6.
25Farrell and Todani (2004). Gidlow (1979) points out that psychologically such a move
looked bene￿cial. For those investors not fully acquainted with existing blocked rand pro-
cedures, the announcement making blocked rand balances o¢ cially transferable may have
created a favourable impression.
14Finally, let us again summarize the exchange rate system in a table. We take
ej and sj to be respectively the commercial and securities rand exchange rate in
period j, j = 1, 2. In addition, if we again take (a) to be the commercial rand
market route and (b) to be the securities rand market route for investment into
South Africa we obtain the following table26
Table 2.
Invest principal: Repatriate principal: Repatriate interest:
Non-resident: Via (a): e1, or s2 e2
Via (b): s1
3.3 The ￿nancial rand I (1979-1983)
Asked by the government to investigate exchange rate arrangements in South
Africa, Gerhard de Kock, later to be governor of the South African Reserve
Bank, published its relevant interim report in January 1979.27 The report in-
cluded both short-term and long-term recommendations. Farrell and Todani
(2004) summarize it in the following way. In the longer-term, on the assump-
tion that the pressures on the capital account of the balance of payments would
ease over time, the report proposed a uni￿ed rand exchange rate system subject
to a managed-￿ oat, with limited exchange controls being applied only to resi-
dents. In the shorter-term, the commission considered a formal dual exchange
rate system with a managed, market determined rate for an independent and
￿ exible ￿ commercial rand￿and a more freely ￿ oating rate for a ￿ ￿nancial rand￿ .
As pointed out by Farrell and Todani (2004), the changes included extend-
ing the uses which non-residents could make of the currency, as well as allowing
certain resident transactions to take place via the (securities rand) market. This
widening of the market was in order to remove the imbalance between the sup-
ply and demand for securities rand, that is lowering the securities rand discount.
Equity investment and disinvestment by non-residents, as well as transfers from
deceased estates to non-residents and immigrant funds, became ￿ ￿nancial rand￿
transactions. Residents￿use of the ￿nancial market was to be expanded gradu-
ally and would require approval, although not necessarily on an individual basis
for small applications.
As Schaling (2005) points out, the gradual expansion of residents￿and non-
residents￿use of securities rand was equivalent to an increase in the demand for
securities rand. It is important to note that restricting the supply was not an
option [Schaling (2005)]. Restricting the supply of securities rand would have
been possible only if controls on out￿ ows were relaxed.
26Note that the case for a non-resident investor, when investing via sj and repatriating the
principal and interest at respectively sj and ej, equals a standard dual exchange rate system
as discussed in section 3.
27De Kock (1979)
15So, balance of payments items associated with capital in￿ ows that were pre-
viously channelled through the commercial market were now directed through
the ￿nancial market. But, as pointed out by Farrell and Todani (2004), the
￿nancial rand exchange rate system did not channel all current account trans-
actions through the commercial rand and all capital account transaction through
the ￿nancial market, as would be the case under a standard dual exchange rate
system (as discussed in section 3). All loan funds were to be transferred via the
commercial market, that is both the principal and the interest. Loan funds in-
cluded: bank loans, syndicated loans, private and public bond issues, debenture
issues, mortgages, parent company current accounts and shareholder loans.
As Farrell and Todani (2004) note, there were three important reasons for
loan funds to be transferred through the commercial market. First, with the
￿nancial rand likely to be at a discount to the commercial rand, it was consid-
ered ￿ unfair￿to expect resident (SA) borrowers to repay at the ￿nancial rate
existing loans originally contracted at the o¢ cial rate. Second, it was di¢ cult
to distinguish loans and trade credit. A ￿nal reason was that Gerhard de Kock
argued that in a period of rapid economic growth the commercial exchange rate
would need the support of the net in￿ ow of loan funds. As Schaling (2005)
explains, growth in South Africa would suck in imports, especially of capital
goods, which tend to increase the demand for foreign exchange and would place
pressure on the commercial rand exchange rate. If loan funds increase at such
times, diverting them through the commercial rand market would increase the
supply of foreign exchange in this market, o⁄setting the excess demand for for-
eign currency.
In addition to the widening of the market, Gerhard de Kock proposed that
intervention by the Central Bank was allowed as part of a coordinated policy
of intervention in the commercial and ￿nancial markets.28 As Schaling (2005)
points out, this measure was taken in order to smooth sharp movements in the
exchange rate, although it was anticipated that intervention in the ￿nancial
rand market would be infrequent and of limited magnitude.
Finally, let us summarize the ￿nancial rand system in a table. If we take
ej and fj to be respectively the commercial and ￿nancial rand exchange rate in
period j, j = 1, 2. If, in addition, we take (a) to denote the commercial rand








cipal and interest of
loan funds:
Non-resident: e1 e1 e2
28Farrell and Todani (2004)
163.4 The uni￿ed rand (1983-1985)
In February 1983 the ￿nancial rand regime was abolished and was succeeded by
a single uni￿ed exchange rate system (a ￿ URS￿as opposed to a DRS). That is,
it was replaced by a system equal to the one as discussed in subsection 2.1. The
uni￿ed rand was of short duration, though. Farrell and Todani (2004) point
out that the timing of the uni￿cation was a ￿ disaster￿ , among others due to the
relatively high discount of 17% of the ￿nancial rand vis-￿-vis the commercial
rand (or in logs, ft - et) at that time. Although controls on non-resident investors
were e⁄ectively removed at this time, those on capital transfers by resident
investors remained largely in place. The apparatus for registering non-resident
ownership of securities was also retained.
Let us again summarize the exchange rate system in a table. If we take ej
to be the commercial rand exchange rate in period j, j = 1, 2, we obtain the
following table29
Table 4.
Invest principal: Repatriate principal: Repatriate interest:
Non-resident: e1 e2 e2
3.5 The ￿nancial rand II (1985-1995)
As pointed out by Farrell and Todani (2004), the ￿nancial rand exchange rate
system was re-introduced on 2 September 1985, as part of the response of the
South African Reserve Bank to South Africa￿ s debt crisis. This crisis was largely
triggered by political events. Notably, the Rubicon speech on 15 August 1985,
by then State President P.W. Botha, triggered large scale capital ￿ ights out of
South Africa. Prior to the speech expectations arose that political reforms of
the apartheid system would be made to appease foreign bankers. In his speech,
given to the Natal Congress of the ruling National Party, P. W. Botha e⁄ectively
destroyed this expectation. As a response, the Government suspended trading
on the JSE and the foreign exchanges through to 2 September.
Further events, prior to the Rubicon speech, that helped building the crisis
were that the South African government declared the State of Emergency on 20
July 1985, the French government￿ s announcement of restrictions on investment
in South Africa and the circulating rumors that international banks would not
renew loans to South Africa, which were falling due at the end of August.30
More speci￿c, as Farrell and Todani (2004) explain, the 1985 debt crisis was
preceded by the refusal of US banks to roll over loans to South Africa. In
29Note that this table indeed equals the case for a single uni￿ed exchange rate system as
discussed in section 2.
30Farrell and Todani (2004)
17August, Chase Manhattan Bank made the decision to call in all its outstanding
loans to South Africa and other banks followed suit.
As a response, on 1 September 1985, an emergency package of measures was
announced that included a moratium on debt re-payments (the so-called ￿ stand-
still arrangement￿ ) and the re-introduction of the ￿nancial rand exchange rate
system. Both were put in practice the following day. It was not until 13 March
1995, that the latter was abolished. From this date onwards non-residents were
able to invest and repatriate funds, and transfer capital and current gains, with-
out restriction.31 Farrell and Todani (2004) note that, following the abolition of
the ￿nancial rand, the gradual liberalization of exchange control has proceeded
smoothly until the present time.32
Finally, if we again summarize the ￿nancial exchange rate system we obtain
table 3.
4 Data and variables
All data series were collected (or computed) for the period 1973 until 1995. More
speci￿cally, we make use of data from 1973:01 until 1995:02. The observations
have a monthly frequency and therefore total 266. In addition, the estimations,
which are described in the next two sections, make use of the following time
series:33
￿ The interest rate for South Africa (domestic) and for the United States
(foreign) is taken to be the three-month treasury bill rate (as perunages).
The source is Thomson Datastream, with data labels: SAGBILL3 and
USGBILL3, respectively. We obtained daily observations, but we will
make use only of the day that is closest to the end-of-the-month. These
variables are denoted as: it and i￿
t, respectively.
￿ The commercial and ￿nancial rand exchange rates (de￿ned as unit of do-
mestic currency per unit of foreign currency) have been obtained from the
South African Reserve Bank. The observations were obtained as end-of-
the-month. Note that during one of the ￿ve periods a uni￿ed exchange
rate regime was in place. Consequently, we only have the ￿nancial rand
exchange rate for four periods.34 These variables are denoted as: et and
ft, respectively.
31Farrell and Todani (2004)
32For more details on - and a critique of - the latter period, with special emphasis on the
so-called ￿ asset-swap￿mechanism see Schaling (2005).
33Our CEPR discussion paper (DP6347) gives a more elaborate discussion on the variables.
That is, in our discussion paper we also give a ￿gure and the descriptive statistics for each of
the variables. In addition, in our discussion paper we also test for stationarity. We ￿nd that
the variables that we will use in the estimations are all stationary. Finally, the data for all
the time series can be obtained at http://www.petervanderwindt.eu/publications.
34Take note that we previously also named the ￿nancial rand (fj) the blocked (bj) and
securities (sj) rand. This does not matter as each of them de￿ne the "parallel" exchange rate.
18￿ Then we computed the four variables that we will actually use in our
estimation (for this see the next section). First, we computed the following
variables: ln(it) and ln(i￿
t), which we denote respectively as: ^ {t and ^ {￿
t.
￿ We also computed the following variable: ￿ ^ ft+1, which we computed as
follows: ^ ft+1 ￿ ^ ft, where ^ ft+1 = ln(ft+1) and ^ ft = ln(ft):
￿ Finally, we computed the implicit subsidy: ln(st), which we will de-
note as: ^ st. Again, st is given by equation (6) or, more speci￿cally,
s = [(ft+1 ￿ et+1)=et+1].
5 Econometric speci￿cation
In this section we will discuss the equation to be estimated. The results will
be discussed in the next section. As was noted in the previous section, we
take the relevant investment to be a three-month government bond that will be
held for the life of the bond. Before we start it is important to summarize the
arbitrage relationships for a three-month government bond. We do this because
of the unequal treatment of di⁄erent assets in South Africa￿ s (dual) exchange
rate systems.35
5.1 Summary for the three-month bond
In section 3, we discussed the di⁄erent (dual) exchange rate systems that were in
place in South Africa from 1960 until 1995. Below we give a summary for a three-
month bond by making use of the elementary arbitrage relationships that were
introduced in section 2. Again, we do not discuss the case for a resident investor.
As resident investors were not allowed to invest in the foreign country their
arbitrage relationships are irrelevant.36 Moreover, as we extensively discussed
in section 3, and as can be seen from ￿gure 3, the ￿nancial rand exchange rate
traded at a discount vis-￿-vis the commercial rand exchange rate. Consequently,
we will only discuss the indirect channel for investment into South Africa.
For the blocked rand (1961 - 1976) and the securities rand (1976-1979) pe-








where the non-resident investor invests and repatriates the principal at the ￿-
nancial rand exchange rate (f1 and f2, respectively), whereas he/she repatriates
35To give an example, the arbitrage relationship for a non-resident investor under the blocked
rand system would be di⁄erent if the period of ownership was longer than ￿ve years. That is,
the principal would be repatriated at e2 instead of at b2.
36Note that only considering the non-resident investor does not jeopardize the generality of
any of the questions asked in this paper. For, as Schaling (2005) points out, a subsidy is equal
to a negative tax.
19the interest at the (managed) commercial exchange rate (e2).37 Arbitrage re-
lationship (9) should look familiar as it is equal to equation (4). That is, it is
equal to a standard dual exchange rate system as we discussed in section 2. As
was extensively discussed in subsection 2.3, this arbitrage relationship contains
an implicit subsidy. This result is of high importance.
The arbitrage relationships under each of the two ￿nancial rand regimes
(1979-1983 and 1985-1995) are identical. We obtain the following arbitrage
relationship
1 + i￿ =
f1
f2
(1 + i) (10)
Under each of the two periods, the non-resident investor would have invested
the principal at the ￿nancial exchange rate and would have repatriated both
the principal and the interest at the ￿nancial exchange rate.
Finally, for the uni￿ed rand period (1983-1985) we obtain the following ar-
bitrage relationship
1 + i￿ =
e1
e2
(1 + i) (11)
Under this regime, the non-resident investor would have invested the principal
at the commercial exchange rate and would have repatriated both the principal
and the interest at the commercial exchange rate. Take note that equation
(11) equals equation (2). The latter, as we showed in section 2, is equal to the
uncovered interest parity condition.
For completeness, we summarize the relevant arbitrage relationships for a
non-resident investor, holding a three-month South African government bond
under a DRS, in table 5 below.


























37Again, take note that the ￿nancial rand (fj) was previously named the blocked (bj) and
securities (sj) rand. This does not matter as each of them de￿ne the "parallel" exchange rate.
In addition, note that no SARB intervention in the blocked rand market was possible prior
to o¢ cial recognition of this parallel exchange rate via the securities rand mechanism.
205.2 Estimating the impact of the implicit subsidy
Now, we are ready to test whether the subsidy implicit in South Africa￿ s dual
exchange rate system was of signi￿cance. For this we go back to the model and
results we obtained earlier in this paper. That is, we will make use of equation
(4￿ ) that we obtained in section 2. Let us rewrite equation (4￿ ) as an equation
that can be directly estimated. In order to do this, we rewrite (4￿ ) in terms of
the domestic (SA) interest rate and take natural logs, so that we obtain38
^ {t = ￿ + ￿11^ {￿
t + ￿12￿ ^ ft+1 + ￿2^ st + "t (12)
where ^ {t = ln(it); ^ {￿
t = ln(i￿
t); ￿ ^ ft+1 = ^ ft+1 ￿ ^ ft, where ^ ft+1 = ln(ft+1) and
^ ft = ln(ft). In addition, ^ st = ln(st) where st = [(ft+1 ￿ et+1)=et+1]. The left-
hand side is the domestic (South African) interest rate. The right hand side now
includes the subsidy implicit in a dual exchange rate. It should be obvious now
for the reader to see where we are going. The main aim of this paper was to see
what in￿ uence the subsidy implicit in South Africa￿ s dual exchange rate system
had on the domestic (SA) interest rate. Our argument is that a dual exchange
rate system contains an implicit subsidy and that this implicit subsidy would
lead to a lower interest rate in South Africa. In equation (12), the parameter
￿2 indicates how much the domestic (South African) interest rate (^ {t) would
increase in percentage points if the subsidy (^ st) is increased by one percent.
So, what results could we expect? First, for the period in which a DRS was in
place we expect ￿2 to be signi￿cant. On the other hand, for the period in which
no DRS was in place (and so no implicit subsidy existed) we do not expect
￿2 to be signi￿cant. Second, following our de￿nition of ^ st, a higher implicit
subsidy (a higher st) leads to a higher ^ st. Our argument is that, and this is the
whole argument of the paper, a higher ^ st then leads to a lower SA (domestic)
interest rate (^ {t). More formally, (@^ st=@st)(@^ {t=@^ st) < 0, where @^ st=@st > 0
and @^ {t=@^ st < 0. So, because we expect the South African interest rate to be
lower with a higher subsidy (again, this is the whole argument of our paper),
we expect ￿2 to be negative in the period where a dual exchange rate system
was in place. Finally, what magnitude of ￿2 could we expect? To answer this
it is important to note that ￿2 can also be interpreted as the probability that
a non-resident (US) investor gets the subsidy in the next period (period t+1).
In other words, ￿2 can be interpreted as the probability that the DRS system
is still in place in the next period. To see this note that ft can take either one
of two values in period t+1. If the DRS is still in place it will be ft+1; and we
should obtain ￿2 = ￿1. However, if the DRS is abolished ft+1 will be equal to
et+1; and as a result we should obtain ￿2 = 0. So, if there is a probability that
the system is abolished, we expect ￿2 to be between 0 and -1.
38See appendix (8.2) for the full derivation.
216 The results
This section will report the results of the estimating equation we discussed in
the previous section. That is, we have a look at the sign, the signi￿cance and
the magnitude of the subsidy implicit in a dual exchange rate system.
6.1 The implicit subsidy
We estimated equation (12) over the period 1973:01-1983:01 with three lags. We
chose the latter by making use of the Ljung-Box Q-statistics and the Breusch-
Godfrey Lagrange multiplier test.39 First we regressed equation (12) by sepa-
rating the periods where a standard dual exchange rate system was in place,
or not. That is, we included a dummy for the blocked and the securities rand
exchange rate periods (BR&SR) and for the ￿rst ￿nancial rand period (FR(I)).
The results are given in table 6 in the column under regression 1.
Table 6. Estimates of the implicit subsidy.






￿ ^ ft+1 0.0848 0.1062￿
0.0547 0.0576








# Observations 113 113
R2 0.9829 0.9831
Durbin-Watson 1.7034 1.7140
Notes: ***(**)[*] signi￿cant at the 1% (5%) [10%] signi￿cance level. Newey-
West standard errors in parentheses. BR&SR, BR, SR and FR(I) denote the:
blocked- and securities rand combined, the blocked-, the securities- and the
￿rst ￿nancial rand exchange rate system, respectively.
All of the variables have the sign that we expected. The coe¢ cients of the
variables ^ {￿
t and ￿ ^ ft+1 are positive as expected. In addition, the coe¢ cient of
the implicit subsidy (^ st) is negative during the period where a dual exchange
rate system was in place and, strongly supporting the argument of this paper,
39In addition, for completeness, we checked the robustness of our results. Our results do
not fundamentally change when additional lags are added or substracted.
22this coe¢ cient is non-negative when no dual exchange system was in place. So,
it seems as if an increase in the subsidy leads to a decrease in the domestic
interest rate when a DRS is in place; indeed con￿rming the argument of this
paper. Moreover, as expected, we obtain a ￿2 (the coe¢ cient on the dummy
variable BR&SR) that is between 0 and -1. However, although the signs of the
variables and the magnitude of ￿2 are as expected none of the variables, with
the exception of ^ {￿
t, is signi￿cant; a seemingly disappointing result.
We estimated equation (12) again. But now we also distinguished among
the two periods where a standard dual exchange rate system was in place. We
do this to see whether there was a di⁄erent e⁄ect of the implicit subsidy in
these periods. Our results are surprising. As can be seen in the column under
regression 2 in table 6, the variables have again the expected sign. Now, however,
we obtain the result that the implicit subsidy is signi￿cant during the securities
rand period but not during the blocked rand period. How is this possible?
First, note that the fact that the implicit subsidy was not signi￿cant during the
￿rst ￿nancial rand period is to be expected, as no standard dual exchange rate
system existed at the time and, consequently, no implicit subsidy existed. But
why was the implicit subsidy not signi￿cant during the blocked rand system?
We showed above that in that period, just as during the securities rand period,
a standard DRS was in place.
The answer is interesting and has strong implications. Let us fully write out,
and for one more time rewrite, equation (4) to obtain











where the third term on the right hand side is again the implicit subsidy payment
(si). Indeed, an increase in the subsidy leads to a decrease in the domestic
(South African) interest rate. As we can see from ￿gure 3, which was given
earlier, the commercial rand (ej) was very stable during the blocked rand and
the securities rand period. The reason is that until 1979 the exchange rate was
essentially ￿xed, being pegged to various currencies.40 Consequently, over these
two periods the South African government was not able to in￿ uence e2. As a
result, the implicit subsidy could only be increased - and therefore the domestic
interest rate decreased - by engineering an increase in f2.
Now, in section 3 we have argued extensively that although during the
blocked rand period the parallel market could be characterized as legal, it was
never o¢ cially recognized by the South African government.41 However, as was
also extensively discussed in section 3, in February 1976 the securities rand ex-
change rate mechanism was introduced. Under the new regulations securities
rand were bought and sold through brokers on the JSE.42 As Gidlow (1976)
40World Currency Yearbook (various issues)
41See Farrell and Todani (2004)
42See Schaling (2005)
23pointed out, by allowing non-resident balances to be transferred freely and to
o¢ cially recognize the blocked (and now the securities) rand discount, the Cen-
tral Bank had now the ability to enter the market for securities rand as well.
Hence, the Central Bank could now intervene in the securities rand market. This
result is of high importance. That is, it could in￿ uence f2 in equation (13). As a
result, it was only during the securities rand that the South African government
via its central bank (the SARB) could actually in￿ uence the implicit subsidy
and thereby lower the domestic interest rate. This was therefore the reason that
the implicit subsidy was only of economic and statistical signi￿cance during the
securities rand in our estimation. In addition, this now also provides the reason
why Figure 2 indicates that only the securities rand regime implied a structural
deviation from uncovered interest rate parity (remember: the highlighted part
in ￿gure 2).
As noted above, and as can be seen in the column under regression 2 in
table 6, the variables again have the expected sign. An increase in the interest
rate in the United States and an expected depreciation of the ￿nancial rand
each have a positive e⁄ect on the domestic (SA) interest rate. In contrast to
our previous regression, now both variables are signi￿cant. Finally, note that
the magnitude of ￿2 (the coe¢ cient on the dummy variable SR) is again, as
expected, between 0 and -1. In other words, during the securities rand period
the market took into account the probability that the DRS could be abolished.
That this sentiment was present in the market is illustrated in Figure 2, where
the return for a non-resident (US) holder of South African debt in excess of
the return on comparable assets in the United States (the investment subsidy,
which in turn came about as a by-product of South Africa￿ s dual exchange rate
system) decreased markedly before 1979:02; that is, before the securities rand
was actually abolished in 1979:02.
The question that then remains is, to what extent could the South African
government actually decrease the domestic interest rate? According to equation
(13) this in￿ uence was likely too be quite limited. If the South African author-
ities would increase the implicit subsidy by raising f2 they then also increased
the second term in equation (13); namely the implied depreciation of the rand
exchange rate. As a result, we have that the South African government had a
lower domestic interest rate during the securities rand only thanks to the level
e⁄ect of the premium that the commercial rand commanded over the ￿nancial
rand (indeed, see the jump in the premium by inspecting ￿gure 3). From month
to month, however, the South African government had little power to decrease
their domestic interest rate by means of increasing the implicit subsidy as it
would have led to a depreciation of the rand exchange rate.
6.2 Bene￿ts to the South African government
South Africa￿ s capital in￿ ow subsidy has lowered the domestic cost of borrowing
to the advantage of domestic borrowers, including the South African govern-
24ment. The budgetary e⁄ect of a lower domestic interest rate can be calculated
at follows. First, let us assume that the non-resident investors are the marginal
investors. We then calculate how much higher the (long-term) government debt
yield would have to be if the implicit interest subsidy to non-residents were
taken away, on the assumption that the rates of depreciation of the dual ex-
change rates remain unchanged.43 This simply equals the implicit subsidy pay-
ment as calculated by equation (6) times it. The calculated government debt
yield di⁄erential multiplied by the stock of domestic government debt (net of
any government debt held by monetary authorities) yields an estimate of the
debt-service savings on account of the dual exchange rate system. Take note
that this is the theoretical maximum of debt-service savings; i.e. it would be
true only when ￿2 = ￿1. From the previous subsection, however, we know
that ￿2 = 0:0479. Then, by multiplying the theoretical maximum debt-service
savings by this amount (0.0479) we obtain the debt-service savings for South
Africa on account of the dual exchange rate system. These debt-service savings
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Figure 4. SA government￿ s debt-service savings (% of GDP).
The ￿gure indicates that the ￿nancial implications of a dual exchange rate
system can be substantial. More speci￿cally, the computed debt-service sav-
ings due to a dual exchange rate system reached a high of 0.1 percent of South
Africa￿ s GDP in September 1978 as then the actual government yield and the
￿nancial rate premium were both relatively high. Theoretically, it could have
been as a high as 2.15 percent of GDP. On average, over the securities rand
period, the debt-service savings amounted to 0.07 percent of GDP (theoretical
43As Huizinga (1996) notes, the rate of depreciation of both exchange rates in the end re￿ect
exchange fundamentals such as money growth.
44The data for GDP was taken from Thomson Datastream, with data label: SAI99B.CB.
We obtained quarterly observations at current prices in millions of rand. As a result we used
each observation for three months.
25maximum: 1.46). Whereas, over the blocked rand period the debt-service sav-
ings amounted to 0.02 percent of GDP (theoretical maximum: 0.41). Take note
that indeed the implicit revenue is substantially higher during the securities
rand than during the blocked rand exchange rate period.
7 Conclusion
A dual exchange rate system with separate commercial and ￿nancial exchange
rates drives a wedge between the domestic and foreign returns on comparable
assets. This paper showed, by building further on Huizinga (1996), that the
arbitrage relationships linking the returns on domestic and foreign assets for
resident and non-resident investors are therefore generally inconsistent. This
implies that capital controls have to be an integral part of a dual exchange rate
system. Furthermore, it was shown how a dual exchange rate system can be
interpreted as a border tax or subsidy on international capital income ￿ ows. We
did this by rewriting the above mentioned arbitrage relationships and singling
out the implicit tax or subsidy.
This paper then presented empirical evidence on the aforementioned implicit
tax or subsidy. First, it is shown that a subsidy implicit in a dual exchange rate
system is a signi￿cant determinant for the deviation from uncovered interest
parity. That is, it is shown that a dual exchange rate system makes it possible for
a government to (substantially) decrease its domestic interest rate. In addition,
we calculated that the overall debt-service savings from this lower domestic rate
can be substantial, thereby providing a rational for having a dual exchange rate
with capital controls as part of a country￿ s optimal tax policy.
This paper, though, also discussed in detail the historic development of South
Africa￿ s (dual) exchange rate systems. We showed, by building further on previ-
ous work by Schaling (2005), that South Africa￿ s dual exchange rate system was
the unintended consequence of the imposition of controls on capital out￿ ows in
1960 after the Sharpeville massacre and the subsequent capital out￿ ow. Fur-
thermore, again by building further on Schaling (2005), we point out that the
dual exchange rate system led to many perverse unanticipated e⁄ects. Severely
limiting capital in￿ ows was one of them.
As a result, the apparent bene￿ts of using capital controls and/ or a dual
exchange rate system as part of a governments tax policy may be limited. The
theoretical need to combine dual exchange rate systems with capital controls
and their potential perverse unanticipated e⁄ects, prima facie render dual ex-
change rate systems unattractive. Furthermore, and not yet discussed, dual
exchange rate systems are relatively nontransparent, as the implicit tax rates
have to be calculated from exchange rate data. In addition, taxing capital
income through the exchange rate system further introduces undesirable uncer-
26tainty to the extent that the exchange rates are variable.45 Finally, the link
between administrative exchange rates and capital controls and taxation also
may give rise to opportunities for favoritism and abuse. These arguments imply
that a dual exchange rate system may be a rather inept way to impose a tax or
subsidy on cross-border capital income ￿ ows. Thereby providing a rationale for
the recent trend in exchange rate liberalization and uni￿cation.
8 Appendix
8.1 From equation (4) to (4￿ )
Rewriting


















If we de￿ne ￿ ￿ f2=e2 (see section 2.3), add and substract (f1=f2)i on the
right-hand side, and de￿ne s ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 (see section 2.3), we obtain
1 + i￿ =
f1
f2
(1 + i + si) (4￿ )
8.2 From equation (4￿ ) to (12)
Rewriting
1 + i￿ =
f1
f2






















This suggest the following linear regression equation, which we have generalized
over time
^ {t = ￿ + ￿11^ {￿
t + ￿12￿ ^ ft+1 + ￿2^ st + "t (12)
where the variables are de￿ned as in the main text. Of course, we then expect
to ￿nd that ￿11 and ￿12 > 0 and ￿2 < 0.
45Take also note, however, that an important reason to institute a DRS is their ability to
insulate domestic prices from short term changes in the parallel exchange rate. In brief, this
is achieved by ￿xing the o¢ cial exchange rate and keeping this rate as a nominal anchor for
prices. See, for example, Marion, et al. (1982) for a more complete discussion.
278.3 From equation (4) to (13)
Rewriting



























where the second term on the right-hand side is negligible (small times small is
very small). Rewriting gives
















where now the third term on the right-hand side is negligible (small times small
is very small). Then, after rewriting equation (18), we obtain











The left-hand side together with the ￿rst two terms on the right-hand side
(where we have substituted fj for ej) equal UIP. Note that this is a di⁄erent way
of writing down UIP than equation (2); especially many elementary textbooks
on international economics write it like (13) because of the ease to understand
this particular formulation. As we see from (13), when a dual exchange rate
system is in place (so fj 6= ej), UIP does not hold and we have a deviation from
UIP equal to the implicit subsidy (taxation) times the South African interest
rate (si for nonresident investors and ￿i for resident investors).
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